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PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT WARS, REVERSE-PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS, AND THEIR ANTICOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS FOR CONSUMERS
Steven Adamson*
Generic drugs have provided considerable cost-savings to
consumers. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides economic incentives
to both generic and brand-name manufacturers, but it is a complicated piece of legislation scattered across numerous sections of the
United States Code. This obfuscation has led to abuse by brand
name and generic drug manufacturers, resulting in anticompetitive behaviors for the consumer. Despite attempts to ameliorate the
problem, a review of case law makes plain that the judicial and
legislative systems are currently inadequate to address this problem.
Litigation typically arises in the context of patented drug
filings after a generic drug manufacturer files an Abbreviated New
Drug Application, for a generic drug modeled after the patented
drug, an act of constructive patent infringement. This then initiates Paragraph IV patent litigation. In order to avoid a finding of
patent invalidity, branded and generic manufacturers enter into
collusive “reverse-payment” agreements in which the branded
manufacturer agrees to pay the generic company to stay out of the
market.
While direct cash payments seem to have been foreclosed in
FTC v. Actavis,1 subsequent iterations of reverse payments have
evaded this holding, allowing reverse payments to continue to the
frustration of many consumers. Finally, the latest mode of manipulation does not involve monetary transfers, but rather manipulates the FDA system via product hopping, risk evaluation monitoring systems, and sham citizen petitions to achieve
anticompetitive aims.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The University of Mississippi School of
Law; Ph.D. Chemistry, 2006, The University of Southern Mississippi.
1
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013).
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This Article examines the patenting system for generic
drugs, the numerous modes of reverse-payments, and the difficulty
of prescribing a bright-line approach to often fluid definitions of
“reverse payments.” This is the first article to review the array of
reverse payment modes, explaining how legislative and judicial efforts to combat these practices have failed, and arguing for a systemic legislative approach to solve this problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ost patients are quick to realize the benefits of generic drugs—
M
due in large part to the creation of the Hatch-Waxman system
for generic drugs approval. Once a patent term has expired, generic
drug manufacturers can begin making a drug available—often at
drastically reduced costs to the public. However, easy access to generic drugs has not always been available. Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the system for FDA approval for generic drugs was onerous.
In 1962, following the discovery that thalidomide was prescribed to pregnant women resulting in severe birth defects, drugs
needed to be tested for safety and effectiveness before the FDA
would approve them for marketing under new amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2 This required both brand
name and generic drug manufacturers to perform expensive and
time-consuming clinical trials, despite the fact that a generic drug
is defined as pharmaceutically equivalent to the brand-name drug.
Generic drugs have the same active ingredient, strength, dosage
form, route of administration, and are bioequivalent. A statutory
exception allowed generic drugs to be approved with a paper new
drug application (NDA), which piggy-backed on published medical studies, thereby eliminating the expense of clinical trials to verify safety and efficacy for the generic manufacturer.3 The chilling
effect these regulations had on the generic drug market cannot be
understated: there were only fifteen “paper NDAs” between 1962
and 1984, despite at least 150 drugs that were off-patent,4 presumably because there were no published studies that the generic companies could use and/or clinical trials were cost-prohibitive, making generic drug manufacturing a venture of limited profitability.
To encourage the introduction of generic drugs onto the
consumer market, in 1984 Congress enacted The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, informally known as
the Hatch-Waxman Act.5 This landmark legislation was remarkably successful in achieving its aims, but is not without criticism.
2

Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 187, 187
(1999).
3
4
5

Id.
Id.

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
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Although there have been two major and several minor revisions,
the complicated pathway for generic drug introduction has made
the Hatch-Waxman Act prone to abuse by brand name and generic
drug manufacturers alike.6
This Article will proceed in six parts. Part I is an introductory section. Part II examines the branded drug patenting process,
the role of the FDA, and ultimately how a generic drug can enter
the market via the Hatch-Waxman Act. Part III discusses the
modes of reverse payments and the complex strategies that have
arisen as part of the generic and branded manufacturers’ quest to
disguise reverse payment schemes. Part IV will review the previous attempts to combat abuse such as legislative amendments, patent office proceedings, and end user litigation. Part V suggests potential reforms to ameliorate the current problems; Part VI is a
conclusory section.
II. PATENTS FOR DRUGS

A. Branded vs. Generic Drugs
A prudent place to begin is to describe the difference between brand name and generic drugs. A brand name drug refers to
what the FDA calls an “innovator drug,” a drug that is the first in
its class with a particular therapeutically active ingredient.7 Subsequent drug formulations that have the same active ingredient are
either a “pharmaceutical equivalent” or “pharmaceutical alternative.”8 The FDA defines drug products as pharmaceutical equivalents if “they contain the same active ingredient, are of the same
dosage form, route of administration and are identical in strength
or concentration . . . but may differ in characteristics such as shape,
release mechanisms, packaging, excipients (including colors, fla-

U.S.C.).
6
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
7
Jane Lowers & Robert Howland, Generic v. Branded Psychiatric
Medications: Is There a Difference?, MEDSCAPE (Apr. 25, 2012),
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/762343.
8

Id.
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vors, preservatives), expiration time, and within certain limits, labeling.”9 Drug products are defined as pharmaceutical alternatives, if “they contain the same therapeutic moiety, but are different salts, esters, or complexes of that moiety, or are different dosage
forms or strengths.”10 Similarly, a single manufacturer can produce
many different dosage forms (e.g., capsule vs. liquid, extended release vs. standard release), or strengths (e.g., 200mg vs. 1000mg)
within the same product line that are considered pharmaceutical
alternatives.11
Therefore, a “generic drug” is a drug that is the pharmaceutical equivalent to the brand-name drug, with the same active ingredient, and is identical in strength, dosage form, route of administration, is a bioequivalent.12 In fact, as discussed infra in IIb,
bioavailability studies are, with limited exception, the only data
the FDA are allowed to request from generic manufacturers. One
example is the brand-name drug Paxil, a common antidepressant,
where “there are generic versions, or therapeutic equivalents, containing paroxentine hydrochloride, and they are formulated according to the FDA’s bioequivalence standards for generics.”13 A
similar drug, Paxeva, which is paroxetine mesylate, currently has
no generic equivalents.14 Therefore, Paxil and Paxeva are not considered to be pharmaceutically equivalent because of the differences between paroxetine hydrochloride and paroxetine mesylate;
therefore pharmacists are not permitted to substitute a generic version of Paxil of a prescription written for Paxeva.15 Conversely, automatic pharmacy substitution would occur for prescriptions written for Paxil.

B. Bioequivalence
Before 1984, a generic drug needed to go through randomized trials to demonstrate safety, efficacy, and tolerability before it

9

Nomenclature (as excerpted from the Orange Book), FOOD AND
DRUG
ADMINISTRATION
(Oct.
15,
2016),
https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4137B1_07_Nomenclature.pdf.
10
11
12
13

Id.
Id.
Lowers & Howland, supra note 7.

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
14
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was granted approval.16 The major scientific tenet of the HatchWaxman Act was that bioequivalent drugs are therapeutically
equivalent and are, therefore, interchangeable.17 Bioavailability is
“the extent to which a drug is absorbed into the body and is thus
available to act upon the drug’s intended target, also known as the
‘site of action’.”18 For example, an orally ingested drug may be only
partially metabolized, leaving less to act upon the target sit,
whereas intravenous drugs have, generally, much higher bioavailability.19 Bioequivalence is the “absence of a significant difference
between the bioavailability—specifically the extent and rate of absorption—of two pharmaceutical drug equivalents over the course
of a period of time, at the same dose and under the same conditions.”20 These data are obtained through a specific set of pharmacokinetic tests set forth in the FDA’s statutory guidance.21
In sum, when a manufacturer can demonstrate that its generic drug is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug, statutory provisions allow the manufacturer to forego the extensive clinical
studies to demonstrate safety and efficacy, and piggyback off of the
clinical studies that the brand-name manufacturer performed in
achieving new drug approval. This results in a tremendous costsavings to generic manufacturers.

C. Pathway for Introduction of Generic Drugs via the HatchWaxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a complex piece of legislation,
codified in four different sections of the United States Code.22
Broadly speaking, this act creates a regulatory framework for the
approval and marketing of generic pharmaceutical drugs, under
which the generic company can submit an Abbreviated New Drug

16
17

Id.
Id.

18

Alexander Gaffney, Regulatory Explainer: FDA Clarifies Bioequivalence, Bioavailability Approaches for Innovative Drugs (Mar. 17, 2014),
http:www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view/article/4774/; 21
C.F.R. § 320.1(a) (2016).
19
Gaffney, supra note 18.
20
21

Id.

21 C.F.R. § 320.1(a) (2016).
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
22
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Application (“ANDA”) to seek approval of a drug by the FDA. The
ANDA must be a medication bioequivalent to the branded drug
and must generally have the same active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, strength, use indications, and labeling
information as the branded drug.23 A generic company can rely on
the branded pioneering drug company’s prior clinical trial data to
prove the safety and efficacy of the drug, saving the generic company years of work and expense.24
Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman Act expressly allows all
activity necessary to produce the ANDA, including the use of the
patent holder’s data and trial information, as well as samples of
the actual drug to test for bioequivalence, without triggering patent infringement.25 This exemption allows generics to be ready for
market-entry the moment of patent expiration.26
When branded pioneering drug companies file a New Drug
Application (“NDA”) for FDA approval, the law requires the
branded company to list all patents that could “reasonably be asserted” against a generic applicant.27 These are then recorded in a
document referred to as the “Orange Book.”28 As mentioned above,
a generic drug manufacturer is required to make one of four certifications to each of the patents listed for the medication in the Orange Book.29 The first three certifications bring limited litigation,
because they represent that patents have expired (Paragraph I), no
patents are listed in the Orange Book (Paragraph II), or that the
generic manufacturer will wait for patent expiration before market
introduction (Paragraph III).30
The most contentious litigation between generic companies
and branded pharmaceuticals arise out of Paragraph IV certification, alleging that the listed patent is invalid or would not be infringed by the generic, and is an attempt by the generic to enter the

23

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2017).
Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation
of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. on LEGIS. 499, 506 (2016).
25
Id. (explaining that all research activity is statutorily barred from
patent infringement up to, and until, Paragraph IV certification is filed,
which becomes constructive infringement).
26
Id. at 507.
27
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2017).
28
U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (2017).
29
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 507.
24

30

Id.
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market before patent expiration.31 After the generic files a Paragraph IV certification, the branded drug company has 45 days to
initiate litigation or the FDA must approve the generic drug application.32 If the branded drug company initiates litigation, a 30month stay is placed on generic drug approval, allowing the infringement suit to work its way through the court system.33 If the
generic is approved, it is granted a 180-day exclusivity before the
FDA will consider any subsequent ANDA of the same generic
drug.34 If the generic manufacturer loses its patent infringement
suit, it also forfeits its 180-day exclusivity and its certification is
changed to Paragraph III – agreeing not to enter the market until
the expiration of relevant patents.35 Prior research the company
has done is barred from patent infringement by the Act.36 This incentive is meant to challenge weak patents, for example, companies that seek to strengthen their intellectual property portfolio
through patent evergreening.37

D. Patent Term Extension
As part of a legislative quid pro quo, and to compensate patent owners for marketing time lost during the FDA drug approval
process, a branded drug manufacturer could receive a patent term
extension.38 The Hatch-Waxman provisions allow for the extension of the normal term of a patent for up to five years, and for a
total patent term extension of up to fourteen years. Since a generic
manufacturer is permitted to filed an ANDA that relies on data
acquired during a branded company’s clinical trials conducted
prior to approval of the NDA, the branded pharmaceutical com-

31

Id.

32

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2017).

33

Id.

34

Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 502.
Id. at 509, n.46.
36
Id. at 506.
37
Patent evergreening is a legal process of extending intellectual property protection by patenting “multiple aspects of, or incremental improvements to a single drug, so that the last patent expires well after the first.”
Rajarshi Banerjee, Note, The Success of, and Response to, India’s Law
against Patent Layering, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 204, 204-05 (2013).
38
35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3) (2015).
35

15.15.Adamson.docx (Do Not Delete)

5/4/18 7:27 PM

Pharmaceutical Patent Wars

2018

251

pany also receives “data exclusivity” (also known as market exclusivity).39 In other words, the FDA will not accept any ANDA for a
set period, unless challenged under Paragraph IV certification. For
new chemical entities, market exclusivity is granted for up to five
years.40 For clinical studies leading to new drug indications and
formulations, market exclusivity is granted for up to three years.41
For pharmaceutical drugs targeting rare diseases, market exclusivity is granted for up to seven years.42 An additional six months of
exclusivity is granted when the FDA requests, and the brand-name
pharmaceutical company performs, pediatric clinical studies.43

E. Impact of Hatch-Waxman Act
Judged by almost any metric, the Hatch-Waxman Act has
met Congress’ goals of balancing patent protection for pioneering
branded drug companies while simultaneously promoting the
rapid introduction of generic drugs. Since 1984, more than 10,000
generics have entered the market and the generic market share has
risen from 13% in 1980 to approximately 86% in 2013.44
Approximately 88% of all U.S. prescriptions are filled using
generic medications, which saved consumers approximately $217
billion in 2012.45 It is no wonder that branded drugs face severe
financial market competition after generics enter the market.
While most generics enter the market at around 80% discounted of
the branded drug price, those prices can fall to 10% of the original
cost.46 Because of automatic pharmacy substitution, branded pharmaceutical companies generally lose 80-90% of their market share
within a year of generic introduction.47

39

D. Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
Prescriptions For Innovative And Inexpensive Medicines, 19 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 107, 113 (2011) (“[A]s consideration for their agreement
to the Hatch-Waxman compromise, branded pharmaceutical companies
also received ‘data exclusivity,’ a form of additional protection not based
on any patents.”).
40
Mossinghoff, supra note 2, at 190.
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
42

44

Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 503.
Id. at 500-01.
46
Id. at 501.
45

47

Id.
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Patent litigation is expensive. The American Intellectual
Property Law Association’s (AIPLA’s) 2015 Economic Survey reports that the mean litigation costs per side for a patent infringement lawsuit are $359,000 through the end of discovery and
$1,169,000 through final disposition when less than $1 million dollars is at risk.48 Yet, Hatch-Waxman litigation is even more expensive. The Economic Survey reports Hatch-Waxman patent litigation inclusive costs, including costs associated with discovery,
range from $678,000 for claims with less than $1 million at risk to
$6.429 million for claims with greater than $25 million at risk.49
Despite these significant litigation costs, the risk-reward analysis
still heavily favors proceeding with litigation because the 6-month
duopoly can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars to generic
drug manufacturers for blockbuster drugs.50
Costs to pioneering manufacturers are extraordinarily high
and are estimated at $500-800 million to develop a single brand
name drug. This cost can swell to over $1 billion to include products that have failed along the drug discovery process with only
30% making a good return.51 It was in this financial landscape,
combined with the reduced costs relative to their generic competitors and assured market losses, that the pay-for-delay strategy
emerged.
III. REVERSE PAYMENTS MODES
In pay-for-delay settlements, also known as reverse payment schemes, the branded drug company paid the infringing generic manufacturer to delay entry in market. With these reverse
payments, the incentives of both the branded pioneering company
and the generic manufacturer are aligned so that the branded company enjoys a continued monopoly and the generic manufacturer
receives a substantial payment, generally without forfeiting the
180-day exclusivity period.52

48

AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, I-109 (2015).
Id. at I-129.
50
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 502.
51
Sheena Ching, “Pay-For-Delay” Settlements Post-Actavis: Why Mediation Can Tackle The “Unreasonable” Antitrust Settlements, 17
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 277, 283 (2015).
52
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 511.
49
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The complexity of the Hatch-Waxman Act certainly breeds
abuse in which branded pharmaceuticals enjoy a lengthened monopoly, depriving consumers of generic cost savings. On the other
hand, a case can be made that branded drug companies are merely
acting on their corporate fiduciary duties. Part of the legislative
success in the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act resulted from
marrying branded companies patent extension along with generic
drug expedited approval measures through Paragraph IV certification. While intended to tip the balance towards the generic companies (as legislative aims), this is, arguably, no longer necessary
and may be counterproductive to the original goals. The next section will broadly explore the complexity of reverse payment
schemes and the difficulties legislators have had in detecting and
deterring these anticompetitive arrangements.53

A. Generation 1.0
AndroGel, a topical prescription gel for the treatment of low
testosterone in men, was developed by Besins Healthcare, S.A.54 In
August 1995, Besins granted Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. a license to sell AndroGel in the United States, after which Solvay
filed a NDA in April 1999, which the FDA approved in February
2000.55 The commercial success of AndroGel was extraordinary
with U.S. sales between 2000 and 2007 exceeding $1.8 billion.56
Shortly after FDA approval of AndroGel, Solvay filed a patent application—not for the synthetic testosterone whose patent had expired decades earlier—but for a particular gel formulation in order
to include the AndroGel patent in the Orange Book.57
Two generic drug manufacturers, Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Paddock Laboratories, Inc. subsequently developed
generic versions of this drug and filed Paragraph IV ANDAs in
May of 2003, alleging that Solvay’s new patent was invalid.58 The
parties then litigated the patent infringement action, and when the

53

I find Feldman and Frondorf’s approach, supra note 24, particularly
helpful in characterizing reverse payments and, as such, I will adopt their
terminology.
54
FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012).
55
Id. at 1304.
56

Id.
Id.
58
Id.
57
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statutorily-imposed 30-month stay on FDA’s approval was nearing its end, concurrent with the generic companies’ motions for
summary judgment, Solvay faced the real possibility of losing its
monopoly in AndroGel and lost profits of $125 million per year.59
The parties came to a settlement agreement in which Solvay agreed to pay Paddock Laboratories $10 million per year for
six years and $2 million per year for backup manufacturing assistance, and share profits with Watson through September 2015,
projected to fall between $19-$30 million per year.60 After the settlement agreement, the FTC filed an antitrust lawsuit against Solvay, Watson, Par, and Paddock.61 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that a reverse payment generally is “immune from
antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”62 However, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that reverse payments settlement, where large and unjustified, can “bring with it the risk of
significant anticompetitive effects.”63 Perhaps more importantly,
the Court refused to hold that reverse payments are presumptively
unlawful, preferring a rule of reason test.64 Citing that a presumptive rule “is appropriate only where ‘an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets’.”65
Overall, this may be a pyrrhic victory, as the rule of reason
test has largely been described as an onerous burden on plaintiffs
and the judicial system, involving complex economic analysis, requiring extensive information about industries, and following
amorphous standards.66 Many legal scholars have criticized this
approach.67

59

Id. at 1304-05.
Id. at 1305.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1312.
60

63

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013) (Actavis is formerly known as Watson Pharmaceuticals).
64
Id. at 2237.
65
66

Id.

Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 513.
See generally C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009).
67
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In the year following the Actavis decision, the FTC found
the number of suspected reverse payment schemes fell from 42 in
2012 to 21 in 2014—the most current fiscal data available.68 It remains uncertain whether antitrust cases filed by the justice department are a particularly effective deterrent. In 2015, Teva settled a
class action lawsuit brought by purchasers of its drug Provigil, an
anti-narcoleptic drug. Purchasers accused Teva of antitrust reverse payment scheme to keep four generic competitors out of the
market for six years.69 The same month it settled an antitrust claim
with the FTC, bringing the total settlement to $1.2 billion, while
Teva accumulated six more years of patent protection and $3.5 billion in sales, with a net profit of $2.3 billion dollars after settlement
with consumers and the FTC.70

B. Generation 2.0
The prototypical Generation 2.0 settlement is similar to that
of Generation 1.0 in that cash is exchanged but is disguised as a
side-deal. These side deals have evolved with ever-widening complexity and can include promises to promote/market the branded
drug, licensing deals allowing manufacture of each other’s drugs,
“authorized generic” agreements permitted generics to manufacture and sell the brand-name formulation without ANDA approval with profit-sharing attached, agreements to share research
and development, and many subsequent iterations.71
Several examples may be elucidative. As part of an agreement to delay entry of K-Dur, a drug for treating potassium deficiencies, the branded company agreed to buy licenses to multiple
medications from the generic, for which it paid $60 million dollars.
K-Dur quickly abandoned their plans to manufacture the generic
drugs it had licensed, but leaving their licensing payment intact.72

68

Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Agreements Filed
with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003: Overview of Agreements Filed at Exhibit 1, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmafy14rpt.pdf.
69
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 515.
70
Id. at 516.
71
Id. at 515; Hemphill, supra note 67, at 663-66.
72
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 516; see also In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
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A more recent case is Lipitor, a statin used to lower cholesterol,
widely known as the best-selling drug in history with $125 billion
in sales between 1996 and 2011.73 This six-year battle between
Pfizer and the generic filer, Ranbaxy, resulted in a legal issues including sham litigation, sham patent obtainment through data falsification, sham Orange Book listing, sham citizen petitions, multiple and staggered suits, multiple settlements, and ANDA
approval delay by Ranbaxy by moving its own manufacturing
site.74 In the 2008 settlement the generic agreed to delay release of
its drug until 2011 in exchange for the right to market in 11 international markets.75 In coordination with the same settlement,
Pfizer reached settlement agreements on two other branded drugs,
Accupril and Caduet, with the same generic manufacturer for a
paltry $1 million, although industry estimates put the value of the
settlement at closer to $1.5 billion for the generic.76
While Generation 2.0 has given rise to the advent to side
deals, many of these deals contain an array of diverse, anti-competitive contractual clauses that serve as indirect payments and
bottlenecks to prevent generics from entering the market.77 First,
consider the fact that a brand-name drug maker can manufacture
its own generic. Then, settlement terms may include an “acceleration clause” (also known as a no-authorized generic agreement),
which stipulates that the generic may immediately enter the market if another generic files an ANDA and is able to get onto the
market before the first-filing generic’s 180-day exclusivity period
ends (or even before it begins).78 Therefore, the first-filing generic
is not locked into its agreed entry date if another generic is able to
break through the exclusivity period. Yet, the true value of an acceleration clause is not in the reassurance it provides to the delaying first-filer, but rather the disincentive it creates for prospective
generics to subsequently file when faced with immediate competition and no market duopoly.79
One similar example is the settlement that arose out of patent litigation suit/Paragraph IV certification between the generic
manufacturer King Drug and GlaxoSmithKline over Lamictal, an
73
74

Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 518.

Id.
Id.
76
Id. at 519-20.
77
Id. at 521.
78
Id.
79
Id.
75
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anticonvulsant used to treat epilepsy and bipolar disorder.80 Although no cash was exchanged, GlaxoSmithKline allowed the generic to enter the $50 million market for chewable Lamictal 37
months before patent expiration, but denied entry into the more
lucrative $2 billion market for tablet Lamictal until one day before
expiration of exclusivity.81 In exchange GlaxoSmithKline agreed it
would not produce its own generic until after the generic’s 180-day
exclusivity.82 When challenged by a class action suit of purchasers,
the Third Circuit agreed, indicating that no-authorized generic
agreements may represent an “unusual, unexplained reverse transfer of considerable value” under Actavis, allowing antitrust claims
to continue.”83

C. Generation 3.0
The Actavis and King Drug decisions were successful
knockout punches to Generation 1.0 and 2.0, respectively, through
cash pay-for-delay deals, and through large, unexpected payments
in multiple settlements combining layers of superfluous deals with
valuable contractual clauses.84 In Generation 3.0, brand-name
drug companies actively obstruct generics from entering the market at every stage of the generic development: before an ANDA
submittal, during ANDA approval, after a generic has been approved for marketing, and even once the generic has entered the
market.85 There are three principle obstructionist strategies that
are currently being employed. The first uses product hopping, in
which the brand-name drug company takes advantage of its market power to shift consumers to new versions of drugs before a generic drug enters the market and can compete with the “old” version.86 A second strategy manipulates FDA guidelines to ensure
safe use of dangerous drugs to prevent generic manufacturers from
accessing samples for bioequivalence testing.87 A third strategy
process leverages the ability of the public to file a petition, even
80

Id. at 523.
Id.
82
Id.
81

83

King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791
F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015).
84
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 524.
85

Id.
Id.
87
Id.
86
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though meritless, to garner additional delay.88 Taken collaboratively, these strategies can yield delay from a few months to several
years, in contrast previous modes of reverse payments, which
achieved longer monopolies.89

i. First Strategy—Product Hopping
Product hopping makes use of patent evergreening, in
which a drug manufacturer “make[s] minor variations to existing
drugs to extend their patent coverage.”90 In order to complete the
product hop, the following steps are required. First, the brand
name company makes a small change to an existing drug when the
patent rights are about to expire and introduces the new formulation onto the market as an entirely new drug, protected by fresh
patent grants.91 Second, the brand name drug company brings
about a market shift though significant marketing ad campaign
and promotional offers to push doctors to write prescriptions for
the new drug.92 Simultaneously, the brand name company is
providing monetary incentives to drug payers—insurers, HMOs,
and pharmaceutical benefit managers—causing these insurers to
prefer the use of the new drug over the old in the short-term.93 To
complete the product hop, the brand name manufacturer discontinues previous versions of the drug, closes distribution channels
and sometimes buys remaining drug inventory back.94 Ironically,
in some cases the generic is considered to be a “branded” drug for
co-pay and reimbursement purposes, since it is the sole drug on the
market.95 The result of this maneuvering is a generic is unable to
gain a toehold in the market, despite the fact that it was supposed
to introduce competition for the original brand-name drug.96 In a

88
89

Id.
Id.

90

Jonathon Darrow, Debunking the “Evergreening” Patent Myth, 131
Harvard Law Record, Dec. 8, 2010, at 6, http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2009/10/2010-debunking-the-evergreening-patents-mythharv-l-record.pdf.
91
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 527.
92

Id.
Id. at 528.
94
Id. at 529.
95
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
93
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variation of product hopping, AstraZeneca moved Prilosec, a bestselling drug with annual sales of $6 billion, to an over-the-counter
drug, then shifted the prescription market to its newly patented
Nexium, which commentators have argued is little different from
its predecessor.97 Twelve years after its launch, Nexium was the
U.S.’s second best-selling drug with just under $6 billion in sales.98

ii. Second Strategy—Manipulation of FDA Risk Evaluation
Monitory System
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (“REMS”) are risk
management and safety plans that the pharmaceutical company
implements to inform key stakeholders about drug risks, and Elements to Assure Safe Use (“ETASU”).99 ETASU is the most restrictive element of the REMS management plan and directly influence how and when the drug can be used and can include
patient monitoring or testing while taking the drug or special certification for prescribers or pharmacies.100 These are arguably important safety protocols, but they are ripe for abuse. A typical pattern is that a brand-name pharmaceutical company will refuse to
sell a small amount of its drug to a generic drug manufacturer for
bioequivalence testing on the grounds that it violates their
REMS/ETASU policy.101 This is despite the fact that the FDA has
repeatedly insisted that the brand-name company is not violating
the REMS policy.102 However, a restricted distribution scheme
does not even need REMS to be effective in blocking generic competition.

97

Id. see n.153 (although Prilosec was not completely discontinued,
once an over-the-counter version became available, insurers no longer
covered it).
98

Id.
Id. at 533-34.
100
Id.
101
Id.
99

102

See Ctr. For Drug Evaluation & Res., U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) Public Meeting 270-72
(July 28, 2010) (Statement by Jane Alexrad, Associate Director of Policy,
Ctr. For Drug Evaluation and Res., 315), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/NewsEvents/UCM224950.pdf (maintaining that REMS is
not a barrier to acquiring generic samples for generic bioequivalence testing).
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For example, in September 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals
and its founder Martin Shkreli became the subject of intense public hostility after buying the rights to Daraprim, an antimalarial
drug commonly used in HIV-positive patients, for $55 million and
immediately raising the price 5,500%, from $13.50 to $750 a tablet.103 When Turing purchased the rights to Daraprim, it maintained a restricted distribution system for no safety reason whatsoever, making the drug only available through Walgreen’s Specialty
Pharmacy, and creating access problems for hospitals.104 However,
the real motivation for the price hike was to make it difficult for
generics to gain access to samples.105 Shkreli’s previous company,
Retrophin, increased the price of the rare kidney-disorder drug
Thiola 2000%, from $1.50 to $30 a pill, and also created a still-active closed distribution system.106 Documents that Turing Pharmaceuticals turned over to Congress in anticipation of its February
2016 hearing revealed it was internally known that “exclusivity
(closed distribution) creates a barrier and pricing power.”107

iii. Third Strategy—Manipulation of Citizen Petitions
Since 1979, the FDA has allowed the public to request the
agency “issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order to take or
refrain from taking any other form of administrative action.”108
Most citizen petitions are benign and request the FDA to certify a
brand name drug that is no longer on the market or to allow generic approval with minor variations to the referenced brand name
drug.109 As early as 1999, the FDA and FTC recognized the citizen
petition process could be subject of abuse, and so enacted a new
rule in 2007 such that when a citizen petition would delay a generic
from being approved, the FDA must take final action within 150
days unless the delay is to protect public health.110 Ultimately, the
FDA was granted the power to deny a petition if it believed the

103
104

Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 536.
Id. at 537.

105

Id.
Id. at 538.
107
Id.
106

108

21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (1979).
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 543.
110
Codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2017), amended by Improving Regulatory Transparency For New Medical Therapies Act, Pub. L. No. 11489, 1129 Stat. 698 (2015); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 545-46.
109
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petition was submitted for the purposes of delaying approval and
“…does not on its face raise valid scientific or regulatory issues.”111
However, since its enactment in 2008, the FDA has never summarily denied a citizen petition on these grounds, since proving these
requirement can be quite difficult.112 The standard flows from a
line of Supreme Court cases from the 1960s that establishes a general right to petition the government without fear of antitrust liability.113 The legal petition must be objectively baseless, which “requires a showing that no reasonable petitioner can realistically
expect success on the merits” and subjectively baseless, which “requires a showing that the petition tries to conceal an attempt to
interfere directly with competition through the administrative process.”114 Between the fiscal years 2008 and 2015, 175 citizen petitioning delays were filed and only eight were fully granted yet it is
clear that the total number of citizen petitions is increasing.115
One particular successful example is the route taken by
GlaxoSmithKline with regard to Flonase, a steroid nasal spray for
allergy treatment that had annual sales of $1.3 billion.116 Through
a complicated set of citizen petitions it filed as a staggered series,
GlaxoSmithKline was able to keep a generic off the market for
more than 23 months, worth approximately $2.5 billion.117 Even
though two class action suits were filed by purchasers, it settled
these for a mere $185 million.118 Even considering that that a citizen petition costs the pharmaceutical manufacturer several hundred thousand dollars, GlaxoSmithKline achieved a delay that has
been valued at $2.3 billion.119
111

21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E) (2017).
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 547.
113
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965);
E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961); Robin Feldman, Federalism, First Amendment, & Patents: The
Fraud Fallacy, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. Rev. 30 (2015).
114
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 547-48.
115
Id. at 546-47; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Eighth Annual Report to
Congress on Delays in Approvals of Applications Related to Citizen Petitions and Petitions for Stay of Agency Action for Fiscal Year 2015, at 6-7
(2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficesOfMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ReportsBudgets/UCM517279.pdf.
116
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 526.
112

117

Id.
Id. at 527.
119
Id.
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IV. ATTEMPTS TO COMBAT ABUSE WITHIN THE HATCHWAXMAN

A. Legislative Approaches
Congress has not been impotent in curbing abuse within
this system, most notably by amendments to the Hatch-Waxman
through the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003 and the Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007.120 In the first of its
major round of amendments to the Hatch-Waxman in 2003, three
notable changes were made. The most significant change is that a
generic manufacturer loses its six-month duopoly period if it enters
into a pay-for-delay settlement.121 Second, the Medicare Modernization Act all but foreclosed the possibility of multiple 30-month
stays, except for a very limited set of circumstances.122 Third, an
agreement between a brand-name and generic ANDA applicant
relying on Paragraph IV certification must be disclosed to antitrust
authorities.123
Parties quickly found a work around for the six-month duopoly loss by disguising cash reverse payments as side-deals, which
does not trigger the legislative hook.124 Settling parties also found
a workaround for required disclosure of settlement terms to the
FTC, as discussed infra § IVb. While the FDA Amendments Act
of 2007 made significant shifts in operational aspects to the HatchWaxman, including re-authorizing the collection of user fees,
broadening the definition of pediatric clinical studies, and requiring registration and reporting of basic results of clinical trials to the
FDA, this amendment made no significant attempt to curb abuse
within the Hatch-Waxman Act.125
120

See Medicare Prescription Drug, supra note 6.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(BB) (2017); 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (2017); Guidance for Industry: Listed Drugs, 30-Month
121

Stays, and Approval of ANDAs and 505(b)(2) Applications Under HatchWaxman, as Amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003 Questions and Answers at 10-11 (Oct.
2004), https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/98fr/2004n-0087-gdl0001.doc.
122
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2017); 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2017);
Guidance for Industry, supra note 121, at 8.
123
Medicare Prescription Drug, supra note 6.
124
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 512.
125
Efthimios Parasidis, Patients Over Politics: Addressing Legislative
Failure In The Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929,
948-49 (2011).
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B. PTAB Inter partes Review
The America Invents Act (“AIA”), enacted in 2013, was intended primarily to harmonize the U.S. patent system with the remaining world by moving patent grants from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system.126 However, in overhauling the patent
system, one major set of AIA reforms focused on Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) procedural tools used as an alternative to the
extremely expensive patent litigation.127 The AIA amended the
third party submission process to facilitate interested parties’ submissions to challenge patent applications as well as a post-grant
review procedure to provide a forum for challenging a patent application at the PTO.128 However, a petitioner can challenge a patent’s validity in post-grant review for only nine months after patent issuance.129 Because of the narrow window, Congress also
created the covered business method review130 and the inter partes
review131 (“IPR”) in which a petitioner can challenge a patent’s validity after a post-grant window closes.
IPR proceedings have received considerable attention, with
respect to their impact on Hatch-Waxman litigation, particularly
because, like the other post-grant review proceeding, IPR proceedings were designed to weed out weak patents—the very patents
that become part of a Paragraph IV certification when a generic
submits an ANDA.132 An IPR proceeding can be filed after nine
months of the patent’s issuance in which normal post-grant review
would take place but it must be filed within a year of any complaint
alleging patent infringement.133 IPR proceedings are adjudicative,
not merely examinational, and so it is not uncommon to have concurrent proceedings in federal district court and IPR proceedings
126

See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (2011)).
127
Id.
128
Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55
B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1447 (2014).
129
Id. at 1448.
130
37 C.F.R. § 42.303 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2011); Pub. L. 112-29,
125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011).
131
35 U.S.C. §§ 311-19 (2012); Pub. L. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 328
(2011).
132
Jaimin Shah, Note, Pulling the ‘Trigger’ on the Hatch-Waxman
Act’s 180-Day Exclusivity Using Inter Partes Review, 14 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 458 (2015).
133
Id. at 458-59.
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at the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”). Although, the district court will usually stay the court proceedings until the BPAI renders its decision. Unlike post-grant review, parties
may challenge the validity of a patent only under prior art and obviousness, and only on the basis of patents and prior patent applications.134
There are significant differences between district court litigation and IPR proceedings, which may make them variably attractive. First, the standard for instituting a review is quite low
and will be initiated as long as a petition raises a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one
of the claims.”135 Second, after an IPR is initiated, the patent owner
may move to cancel any challenged patent claim or propose substituted claims.136 Third, discovery is allowed but is limited to “depositions of witnesses submitting affidavits or declarations” or
“what is otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.”137 Fourth,
IPR proceedings retain the adversarial nature of district court proceedings but jettison the burdensome procedural aspects, guaranteeing the petitioner a decision on the merits no later than eighteen
months after filing the petition.138 In most cases, this has the effect
of mooting the pending district court litigation,139 although IPR decisions are appealable.140 Fifth, there is no presumption of validity
as there is in district court. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
unpatentability in an IPR is demonstrated by a preponderance of
evidence standard as opposed the higher burden of proof required
in district court litigation which finds invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.141 The lower burden on unpatentability and
swift timeline of IPR proceedings typically allow a generic manufacturer to be the aggressor, which creates an even stronger incentive on the brand-name manufacturer to generate settlement
terms, which are potentially anti-competitive for the public.142

134

Bernstein, supra note 128, at 1477.
35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2016).
136
35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012).
137
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012).
138
Shah, supra note 132, at 459.
139
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2295 (2014).
140
35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012).
141
35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012).
142
When a settlement decision is reached before an IPR proceeding
135
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Perhaps, the most frustrating aspect of IPR litigation is that
the settlements are not submitted for antitrust review. The Medicare Modernization Act is clear that any agreement reached between generic and branded pharmaceutical companies should be
submitted to the FTC for antitrust review, an “agreement” would
presumably include settlements.143 However, in order to avoid antitrust scrutiny under Actavis, parties are taking full advantage of
the PTAB proceedings, relying on claim preclusion rather than an
express delay term that prohibits generic entry.144 For settlements
that arise prior to a finding of unpatentability, parties will issue a
stipulated consent judgment that the patent(s) are valid and enforceable, would be infringed by the generic manufacturer, and
have virtually the same claim-preclusive effect as a court-rendered
judgment on the merits.145 However, unlike the Federal district
court, PTAB judges have no jurisdiction to enforce antitrust laws.
Therefore, in bypassing the federal court antitrust review, a payment can be made in the settlement terms of the PTAB settlement,
which yields essentially the same results as those found in Actavis,
a de-facto reverse payment.146

C. Patient Purchasers in Patent Litigation
Whereas the AIA has accomplished many of its significant
aims, it largely fails in anticipating the growing role that end-users
will play in patent litigation.147 In some cases, end users are threatened by patent assertion entities (“PAE,” also colloquially known
as patent trolls). A typical modus operandi is when a PAE, who
reaches conclusion, which would be favored by the brand-name pharmaceutical company, this terminates the proceedings, but because the decision is not on the merits, the district court litigation is still pending. Consequently, the branded and generic manufacturers would file a settlement
agreement with the district court, presumptively triggering antitrust review of settlement agreement. However, the intricacies of this interaction
are the subject of a future legal commentary for the author and are, as
such, beyond the scope of this manuscript.
143
Medicare Prescription Drug, supra note 6.
144
Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry Settlements at the
Patent Office, 21 (July 26, 2016), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2814532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2814532.
145
See e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) (noting that
consent decrees will generally trigger claim preclusion).
146
Hovenkamp & Lemus, supra note 144.
147
See generally Bernstein, supra note 128.
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may own a patent of dubious enforceability, sends demand letters
for licensing fees.148 More recently, two major U.S. Supreme Court
cases were filed on behalf of end users. In 2013, patients and physicians sued Myriad Genetics to invalidate Myriad’s breast cancer
gene patents in an effort to enhance patients’ access to a genetic
breast cancer test.149 The same year, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on a case involving farmers sued after reusing genetically
engineered seeds by saving of the crops for re-planting the next
season.150 Taken together, these and other cases within the federal
circuit reflect the increased willingness for end users to challenge
patent validity when competitive interests are not being legally
protected by existing statutory patent/FDA architecture. This is
because commercial competitor’s interests and patent end user’s
interests increasingly diverge at settlement.151
Although the FTC files suits to challenge anticompetitive
settlements,152 increasingly end users (patients and drug stores) will
file suit to independently challenge these settlement agreements.153
Many difficulties arise in this area: end users are usually not tech-

148

For example, in January 2013, Personal Audio, LLC, a PAE, began
sending demand letters and suing podcasters, including comedian Adam
Carolla, claiming it owned a patent for podcasting technology. See Press
Release, Elec. Frontier Found., EFF Files Challenge with Patent Office
Against
Troll’s
Podcasting
Patent,
(Oct.
16,
2013),
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-files-challenge-patent-officeagainst-trolls-podcasting-patent, archived at http://perma.cc/S563PRK7?type=image.
149
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013).
150
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); see Organic Seed
Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“Between 1997 and 2010, Monsanto brought some 144 infringement
suits for unauthorized use of its seed. Approximately 700 other cases were
settled without litigation.”).
151
Bernstein, supra note 128, at 1458.
152
FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2226 (2013).
153
See e.g. In re Cirprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. 544
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d
896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Tomoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp.
2d. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litig., 210
F.R.D. 43 (S.D.N.Y 2002); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 350
F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig.,
299 F.R.D. 555 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).

15.15.Adamson.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018

5/4/18 7:27 PM

Pharmaceutical Patent Wars

267

nologically savvy, they are one-time players within patent litigation who arrive late in the game, do not have a long-term stake,
and lack significant procedural tools.154 Perhaps the most significant factor can be the financial asymmetry involved between the
litigants where end users often have no incentive for long-term resolution. Ironically, these collective factors increasingly drive end
users towards a settlement without resolving a claim on the merits.155
In areas other than pharmaceutical litigation, the role of
end users is properly aligned with competitors within the adversarial patent system. For example, a deterrence entity called Unified Patents (“UP”) has filed PTAB petitions, mostly involving
computers and wireless communication technology patents, on behalf of subscribers.156 Technology manufacturing companies pay
UP a membership fee and in return UP seeks to invalidate weak
patents of non-practicing entities which places the business of subscribing companies at risk. UP will only settle for a transferrable
license and never accepts monetary compensation.157 Conversely,
in pharmaceutical litigation, generic and branded manufacturers
act to resist the end user’s challenge the settlement agreement. This
arises because a settlement aligns both generic and branded manufacturers’ interests.158
V. PROPOSED REFORMS
The patent system represents a conscious balancing between innovation and competition. A limited governmental monopoly is granted to the inventor in exchange for invention disclosure, provided that statutory requirements for patentability are
met, as determined by the USPTO, including novelty, usefulness,
and non-obviousness. Therefore, an invalid patent does not meet
the statutory requirements. Unfortunately, the patent system is not

154

Bernstein, supra note 128, at 1463-65.
Id. at 1465.
156
Joe Mullin, Unified Patents Files Legal Challenges Against Top
Three Patent Trolls of 2016, ARSTECHNICA (July 27, 2016),
http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/07/patent-defense-groupseeks-to-knock-out-top-three-trolls-of-2015/.
157
FAQ, UNIFIED PATENTS, http://www.unifiedpatents.com/faq/ (last
visited on Oct. 30, 2016, 1:08 PM).
158
Bernstein, supra note 128, at 1461.
155

15.15.Adamson.docx (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

268

5/4/18 7:27 PM

Vol. 30:2

perfect, and while every patent is presumed valid in litigation,159 in
practice many patents that are litigated end up being invalidated.160 Practically speaking, patents are “probabilistic” and much
of the costs of weeding out bad patents are private.161 Successful
patent validity challenges create a social benefit by eliminating restraint on competition, but firms who bring validity challenges
capture only a fraction of this benefit.162 Because of this misalignment of benefits, the judicial and patent systems are not properly
aligned to protect consumer interests.

A. Redraft the Hatch-Waxman Act
The first step in redrafting the behemoth of legislation is to
ruthlessly simplify it – not an easy task for policy analysts and lawyers who are trained to see nuance in the minutia. But, it is abundantly evident that complexity breeds opportunity for manipulation. A simplified system would provide far fewer opportunities for
legal maneuvering and require fewer resources.
Moreover, redrafting the Hatch-Waxman Act would provide legislators with an opportunity to apply a systems approach,
which would avoid “death by tinkering,” a problem plaguing the
patent system.163 Legislators often address difficult questions by
adjusting legal doctrines in bits and pieces, without comprehensive
159
160

35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
Dunstan Barnes, Note, Technically speaking, Does it matter? An

Empirical Study Linking the Federal Circuit Judges’ Technical Backgrounds to How They Analyze the Section 112 Enablement and Written
Description Requirements, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 971 (2013) (“[P]anels
were more likely to invalidate patents in cases that reached the Federal
Circuit on appeal from the BPAI (a patent invalidation rate of 78.4%) than
on appeal from federal district court (a patent invalidation rate of 52%).”);
Amy Simpson & Hwa Lee, PTAB Kill Rates: How IPRs Are Affecting
Patents, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2015, 9:44 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/699860/ptab-kill-rates-how-iprs-are-affecting-patents (Eighty-eight
percent of petitions with final written decisions resulted in at least one
claim being invalidated, 21% resulted in complete invalidation of the patent).
161
Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 75, 85-86 (2005) (accessible at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/0895330054048650).
162
Id. at 89-90.
163
Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2013).
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logic of the legal implications, ultimately causing the entire doctrinal framework to dissolve under its own weight.164
A systems approach is used in modern medicine to describe
cancer treatment.165 Physicians used to target a tumor by attempting to shrink its size, but tumors are adaptive and can network and
develop work-arounds.166 A systems approach examines and targets the many ways that tumors are networks in a system-wide
fashion and systems-approach based therapy shrinks the tumor
while also targeting the genetic networks by which the tumor may
develop work-arounds.167
While arguably not without controversy, a systems-approach has been successful and widely adopted in other areas of
law. For example, it would be difficult to understate the influence
of the American Law Institute (“ALI”) upon jurisprudence in developing the model penal code, the uniform commercial code, or
numerous other restatements, from which most other state legislators and judges rely upon.168 The ALI is an independent group of
legal scholars that work to clarify, modernize, and improve the
law. Perhaps, the task of re-drafting the Hatch-Waxman Act
would be one that is achievable by this or a similar group.

B. PTAB Settlements that Occur Among Competitors Should be
Submitted to the FTC for Antitrust Review
There is a strong need for antitrust scrutiny and settling
parties should not be allowed to manipulate PTAB IPR proceedings to avoid scrutiny. While not all settlements are detrimental to
the public and may simply reflect changes in perceived strength of
the parties’ position, a PTAB judge should be more skeptical in
accepting settlement terms that preserve a patent’s validity in this
context. Currently, the disclosure of agreements is mandated only
in district court settlements. Therefore, prudent revision may be
that any settlement agreement between branded and generic manufacturers must be submitted to the FTC for antitrust review, either by the PTAB judge or a district court judge. Moreover, if proposed district court litigation coincides with the settlement of a
164
165

Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 24, at 557.
Id. at 556.

166

Id.
Id. at 557.
168
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ALI,
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AMERICAN
LAW
INSTITUTE,
https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2016 10:26 PM).
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PTAB petition between parties, a federal district court judge
should view these as consolidated agreements, and review the entirety of the claim on antitrust grounds.169

C. Move Away from Supreme Court’s Rule of Reason Analysis
for Pharmaceutical Deals Involving Generic
Manufacturers
In granting certiorari for the Actavis decision, the Supreme
Court had three possible standards of antitrust review derived
from circuit splits: (1) per se illegality, (2) scope of the patent test,
and (3) rule of reason analysis.170 A majority of federal courts which
had analyzed reverse payment settlements according to the scope
of the patent test, which presumes the legality of settlements due
to the limited monopoly granted to the patent holder.171 In other
words a reverse payment settlement is presumptively valid as long
as the settlement is not outside the scope of the patent holder’s monopolistic limited grant.172 Instead of the strict per se illegality or a
more lenient “scope of the patent” test, the Supreme Court opted
for middle ground in mandating the rule of reason test when analyzing whether a reverse payment settlement incurs antitrust liability.173
This decision has been widely criticized because of the onerous burden placed on prosecutors. Under the rule of reason test,
courts consider factors if the “questioned practice imposes unreasonable restraint on competition.”174 Such factors may include “relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”175 Moreover,
the antitrust plaintiff carries the initial burden in establishing market power and anticompetitive effect.176 This burden remains high
for antitrust plaintiffs. Congress should place the burden on the
settling pharmaceutical companies, requiring them to show that

169

Hovenkamp & Lemus, supra note 144.
Ching, supra note 51, at 289.
171
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 (11th
Cir. 2003).
170

172

Id.

173

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
175
Schering-Plough Co. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005).
174

176

Id.
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they are proper and not anticompetitive through appropriate legislative enactments, as discussed supra in § V(a)-(b).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Hatch-Waxman Act revolutionized the generic drug
market by providing incredible incentives to generic manufacturers to challenge weak patent claims and thus allowing speedy delivery of generic drugs to the market by introducing competition
and dramatically lowered prices for consumers. However, the complexity resulting from these regulations and any ensuing delay to
the generic drugs entering the market through creative legal strategies has yielded extraordinary profits for branded pharmaceutical
companies.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers, brand-name or generic,
have corporate fiduciary duties to their shareholders. They are in
the business of maximizing returns to their shareholders and, to the
legal extent possible, they will find ways to do so. But the hideand-seek games that pharmaceutical manufacturers play with the
court, FDA, FTC, and PTO are incredibly wasteful. Patents were
granted “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”177 When pharmaceutical companies settle upon terms that are anti-competitive,
this is counterproductive to their Constitutional grant of a limited
monopoly and provides no societal benefit. The proposed reforms
are an effort to simplify an overly complex piece of legislation in
an effort to avoid what we have seen over the past two decades—
a cat and mouse game across the regulatory provisions.

177

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

